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5 Steps to an Anti-ISIS Insurgency

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ISIS Sanctuary Map JAN. 15. 2015 WEBAn anti-ISIS insurgency (the Inside-Out approach) is the most cost-effective way to defeat Islamic State. Insurgencies that have enjoyed durable, tangible local and international support in their fight against predatory or incompetent governments have been consistently successful. Here are five key steps.

 

1. Provide international backing for a tangible goal. An insurgency needs a compelling outcome to rally local and international support. Examples could include a new Sunni Arab state or significant autonomy within Syria and Iraq.

2. Support locally legitimate leaders. An insurgency is a contest for legitimacy. Credible and effective local leadership is essential. The prospect of an alternative to predatory ISIS or Syrian and Iraqi regimes should provide sufficient reason for local leaders to begin emerging. Beware of charlatans.

3. Provide protected sanctuaries. A protected place or set of places on the ISIS periphery to organize, train, gather logistics, plan, and coordinate operations is essential.

4. Promote development of a political program and strategy. These are key to winning the battle of legitimacy and effective use of support. Shadow governance must be trained and deployed to compete with ISIS. The west must resist the temptation to do this for the insurgency or nag them with incessant demands.

5. Provide sustainable, but conditional support. Financial support, logistics, training, advice, intelligence, and air support are among the ways international actors can aid the insurgency. Western states should also learn from Iraq and Afghanistan that unconditional largess breeds corruption and complacency. Conditionality enables supporters to calibrate their backing, encourage positive policies and performance, and sanction where necessary. 

Christopher D. Kolenda is President and CEO of Kolenda Strategic Leadership, LLC, senior military fellow at King’s College, and author of The Counterinsurgency Challenge.  He served as senior advisor and key strategist on Afghanistan and Pakistan to the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy and three Commanders of International Forces, Afghanistan.

Defeating ISIS Begins by Recognizing a Sunni Arab State

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Defeating ISIS Begins by Recognizing a Sunni Arab State

Like many arounCT6qv01WIAAh2Di.jpg-larged the world, I watched reporting of the recent murders of innocent civilians in Beirut, Paris, and over the Sinai skies – all attributed to Islamic State and their sympathizers – in horror. French President Francois Hollande and Russian President Vladimir Putin, like President Obama, have vowed to defeat ISIS. France has struck targets in Raqqa, the putative capital of Islamic State. Russia has increased its support to Syrian President Assad and has begun hitting ISIS as well.

Clearly, ISIS is feeling pressure in Iraq and Syria and aims to take the fight abroad into the cities and living rooms of their enemies using their version of precision strikes. Anti-Muslim hysteria in the west, cynically exploited by politicians, plays directly into ISIS hands by giving them scores of potential recruits among alienated local youths.

Equally as clear, our current approach to defeating ISIS is not succeeding. Airstrikes have hurt but are insufficient to defeating them. President Obama is right that American ground forces can beat ISIS temporarily, but the hard part is afterward – developing and sustaining inclusive and decent governance. Otherwise, we get repeats of Iraq and Afghanistan – initial successes that turn into bloody and expensive quagmires as insurgencies spawn.

Recent suggestions about how to defeat ISIS have been unsatisfying. Many call for more ground forces, but fail to address Obama’s “what next” problem. Some advocate working with Russia and Iran, others urge against. All tend to suffer from an unwillingness to make hard choices, manage trade-offs, and recognize unpleasant realities. Frankly, many of the ideas are trapped in the same thinking that imprisons our current approach to the problem.

It is time to think differently.

We should begin by finally recognizing five unpleasant realities:

1) A proto-Sunni Arab state now exists in the territory controlled by ISIS;

2) A proto-Kurdish state exists;

3) Neither the Assad regime nor the current Iraqi government are going to win the battle of legitimacy in those areas, ever.

4) The Assad regime and Iraqi government have legitimacy in the Shi’a areas they control.

5) The Assad regime will not be defeated as long as it has Russian and Iranian backing.

The upshot is that the current state boundaries can no longer co-exist with durable peace in the region and abroad.

Accepting these realities opens up the potential for game-changing approaches.

1. Outside-In. This approach uses a large scale ground invasion to defeat ISIS. The Sunni State will be governed under UN mandate and gradually turned-over to legitimate, inclusive local governing authorities supported by a decades-long peacekeeping force.

a) A United Nations-backed international agreement for a Four-State Solution needs to be struck in advance. This would recognize the existence of a Sunni Arab and Kurdish state, in exchange for Assad remaining in control of a rump-Syria and the Iraqi government in control of a rump-Iraq. A prospect of a state gives Sunni Arabs the opportunity to create and fight for a better alternative to ISIS.

b) Forces totaling up to 500,000 are likely necessary to defeat ISIS, defend borders, and to maintain security afterward. A significant portion should come from Sunni Arab states.

c) The Sunni Arab state should be governed under UN mandate until a legitimate, inclusive local government can be fully established. A political strategy, not simply a set of milestones, is needed to manage the inevitable scrimmage for post-ISIS power.

d) A UN peacekeeping force should be sized to ensure 20 security force personnel on the ground per 1000 inhabitants. The force additionally needs manpower to protect the boundaries of the Sunni Arab and the Kurdish state. The force could be adjusted over time but should remain in place for roughly 50 years. The commitments for this force need to be agreed in advance.

This approach has the advantage of swift action once the international agreement is struck. The clear drawback is the size of the ground forces requirement for the invasion and the need for interim international governance.

 

2. Inside-Out. This approach supports a local Sunni Arab insurgency against ISIS, backed by protected safe-havens. Once the insurgency defeats ISIS, the new government will be backed by UN peacekeepers. Steps A and D above will remain necessary.

b) UN recognized protected safe-havens should be established and defended by international forces. Much of these forces should come from Sunni Arab states. Safe-havens will give local Sunni Arab opposition groups the opportunity to form a political program, develop a strategy, train, and sustain logistical support.

c) If the opposition unites and forms a coherent and inclusive shadow government, the need for governance under UN mandate could be reduced, modified, or eliminated. A political strategy remains critical.

This approach has the advantage of using a local insurgency to defeat ISIS. Insurgencies that have durable tangible support tend to succeed. Safe-haven, financing, training, logistical, and air support must be provided. The drawback is the likely amount of time required, and the probability that ISIS will continue to foment attacks abroad.

Both approaches require sacrifices and hard trade-offs by all involved. The requirements may be dismissed as too hard. Success on the cheap and without compromises is appealing but unrealistic. If such choices are too hard, then get accustomed to living with ISIS.

If we are willing to make tough choices and pay the price, these two broadly framed approaches have real potential for durable success.

Christopher D. Kolenda is President and CEO of Kolenda Strategic Leadership, LLC, and senior military fellow at King’s College London. He served as senior advisor and key strategist on Afghanistan and Pakistan to the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy and three Commanders of International Forces, Afghanistan.

 

Women’s Diverse Roles in Perpetrating and Countering Violent Extremism

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joana-cook-strife-picture

Joana Cook

By terrorism scholar Joana Cook 

Women play diverse roles in violent extremism.  Understanding this is essential for an effective strategy against groups like ISIL.

Groups such as ISIL have made women an important tool in advancing their cause. Those seeking to defeat groups like ISIL have, too. Sadly, meaningful efforts to involve women against terrorism tend to be poorly integrated and languish in the shadows of military activity.

Women are often viewed as victims of terrorism and limited to stereotyped roles. Success in countering violent extremism (CVE) will be more likely when women are empowered as key actors on terms they define for themselves.

ISIL have increasingly engaged women in a variety of ways, reaching out to urge women to travel abroad and join their organization and wider ‘state’. ISIL have enslaved others deemed to be ‘spoils of war’ such as Yezidi women. Increasingly, governments and other organizations are noting that the empowerment of women is a key tool to counter violent extremism (CVE), as well as noting the disproportionate ways that terrorism and extremism may impact women. The roles women play in relation to perpetrating and countering extremism is diverse and complex, and requires important consideration by all concerned actors.

al Khansaa brigade fighters www.businessinsider.com

al Khansaa brigade fighters www.businessinsider.com

One of the most important aspects for countering terrorism and violent extremism involve understanding the roles that women are playing in them. Women have been both violent and passive actors in extremist and terrorist organizations. In fact, women often have many of the same motivations to join these organizations as men.

Because women have not always been the most violent actors, they are often overlooked in considerations of terrorist organizations. The roles women play may come in the form of logistical support, financing, recruitment, and combat roles (amongst others). These may change over time as opportunities and resources for terrorist groups constrict or expand.

These roles have spanned ethno-nationalist terrorist organizations, such as the Tamil Tigers in Sri Lanka, the Basque separatist movement in Spain, the PKK in Turkey or the IRA in Northern Ireland. Women tend to have higher membership in ethno-nationalist organizations. Miranda Alison notes, for example, that women made up around a third of the combat strength of the Tamil Tigers. Women have also been present in groups of various political, religious and ideological motivations throughout history. In fact, you would be hard-pressed to find many groups that have not engaged women.

In groups like ISIL, women’s roles have largely been restricted to the domestic sphere and ‘culturally appropriate’ roles such as those of teachers or health care workers. Nonetheless, they have also taken on roles in all-female police units (the al-Khansaa Brigades) and there are some indications they may take on increasingly violent roles. An increasing number of women, noted to be around 18%, are now travelling to join the group. Their reasons include participating in the building of a state, travelling with/to a partner, fulfilling religious motivations, and satisfying a sense of adventure. With young girls who are travelling abroad, recruitment may reflect sexual grooming, where they are being lured abroad by men in the group.

While each category of women would have a different status in the group, both women who are seized as slaves, such as the Yezidi women, and women being urged abroad come marry fighters, also serve another purpose. Having women present helps keep fighters linked to the group. As Mia Bloom points out, having a wife, child and house makes it less likely that a fighter will leave a group. Having women available as slaves and wives also acts as an incentive for potential fighters to come join a group. Women play roles in recruiting other women, too, playing off of maternal or ‘big sister’ roles. Understanding these dynamic roles will help all actors effectively counter such organizations.

For governments, women have been increasingly identified as key to CVE initiatives. These are often viewed through their familial roles, such as that of mother or wife. Often noted is their ability to influence family members, see first hand the warning signs of rising extremism and acting as key supporters for de-radicalization processes. Women who have themselves been victims of terrorism, or have lost family members to extremist ideologies, can offer powerful counter-narratives aimed at preventing other individuals from engaging in violence.

An area that is not yet receiving enough attention is the important roles that female security practitioners, such as police, intelligence officers and border guards, for example, can play in CVE initiatives. With an increasing focus on community policing in CVE, women’s engagement should expand.

Women’s roles are dynamic and complex; their agency evolves in diverse ways. There is increasing evidence, for instance, that bottom-up and community-based solutions are among the most successful. These tend to be much more effective than a few spotlight roles at national levels – though these too can be useful for challenging widely perceived stereotypes. When women serve on their own turf as local police or officials or civil society actors, other women tend to get more engaged, too. This can create a virtuous cycle in communities toward discouraging enrolment in violent extremism, and also bring to the table more robust solutions which reflect the concerns and skill sets of the wider population. The combination of local and national roles could be very powerful.

Simply using women as a tool in CVE is not enough. Perfunctory roles risk creating a perception that women are advancing a cynical western or government agenda. This may create opposition toward women’s groups even among those sympathetic to CVE. Empowering women as key actors with voices and important perspectives in shaping CVE initiatives can limit this risk. Such engagement may reduce the tendency to subordinate everything to military targeting. This will likely enhance the effectiveness of CVE overall.

Joana Cook is a Doctoral Candidate in the Department of War Studies at King’s College London, Editor-in-Chief of Strife and a research affiliate with both the Canadian Network for Research on Terrorism, Security and Society (TSAS) and Public Safety Canada (Kanishka). Her work focuses on women in violent extremism, countering violent extremism and counter-terrorism practices in the UK, Canada and Yemen. She has presented her research to senior security audiences in Canada, the UK and US.

#1 Job for the New Afghan Cabinet: Develop a Compelling National Vision and Strategy

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I hope they all get along www.khaama.com

I hope they all get along
www.khaama.com

The Afghan government has nearly a full slate of ministers. On April 18 parliament approved the 16 ministerial candidates put forward by President Ghani and Chief Executive Abdullah.  Only the Ministry of Defense remains open.

Now it is time for the Afghan government to develop a compelling national vision and strategy for a peaceful and prosperous future. 

Whether the new government, formed after 6 months of internal wrangling, can succeed remains an open question.  Afghanistan’s economy remains on shaky ground. Efforts to battle corruption and dismantle kleptocracy have begun but major political reform is needed.  Time is critical. Donor flight after international troops depart at the end of 2016 could doom Afghanistan to another civil war.

The war between the Afghan government and the Afghan Taliban has been growing in intensity and lethality.  Reports of peace talks earlier this year remain unfounded.  Hopes for progress in Afghan-Pakistan relations after President Ghani’s November visit have begun to give way to cynicism and charges of appeasement.  Violence against women remains high; justice is often absent.

Islamic State reportedly claimed responsibility for a murderous bombing in Jalalabad that killed 33 civilians and wounded 125.  The extent of IS presence is uncertain, but Afghanistan and Iran have pledged cooperation against the group. A new major terrorist threat in Afghanistan would be devastating for Afghans and highly damaging to the government.  The Afghan Taliban now claims al Qaeda is no longer present in Afghanistan. IS might provide a common enemy to the Afghan government and Afghan Taliban.

Ghani and Abdullah can increase the likelihood of success by taking one simple but critically important step: direct the Cabinet to develop a credible and compelling national strategy. 

This strategy should integrate five key elements: 1) political reform and governance, 2) contain and reduce the Taliban threat, 3) a dignified and responsible peace process, 4) regional diplomacy, 5) greater economic self-reliance.

The Afghan government has never had a strategy to win the war.  This sad state of affairs is partly the fault of former President Karzai who could never bring himself to believe that his own people were fighting his government, and partly the fault of the Obama Administration who never insisted on a common strategy as a an entry-requirement for massively scaling-up and sustaining our assistance.

To the extent a common approach exists, it has mainly centered on the military.  The Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF), with the help of International Security Assistance Forces – Afghanistan (ISAF), has a military campaign plan.  In the absence of a national strategy to guide and direct it and other elements of national power toward a successful outcome, however, the ANSF are simply fighting and dying in the hope of winning.  This must change.

Armed with a national vision and strategy, the President and Chief Executive can use it as a basis for holding their officials accountable for results, and for extending international support.  President Ghani, when urging President Obama to reconsider his withdrawal timeline, rightly noted the need for the Afghan government to show credible progress.  This strategy can provide a very important part of that argument, and should be sufficient for U.S. and coalition partners to keep an open mind.

The potential strength of the National Unity Government can be realized if diversity and significant common purpose become mutually reinforcing.  Assessing the state of the war and developing a strategy to bring it to a favorable and durable conclusion may bring out the best in the Afghan Government — and give people a vision and game-plan they can rally behind.

 

Christopher D. Kolenda is the President and CEO of Kolenda Strategic Leadership which helps Not-for-Profit organizations maximize their impact in conflict zones.  He commanded Paratroopers in combat and served as Senior Advisor to the Department of Defense senior leadership and to three Commanders of International Forces (ISAF) over four tours in Afghanistan.  See his two books on applied combat leadership: Leadership: The Warrior’s Art and The Counterinsurgency Challenge.

Is a Super-Regional (SAMENA) War Beginning? Considerations for the U.S. and your Non Profit

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"Mideast Yemen"Are we witnessing the beginning of an Arab World War? Foreign Policy’s J.M. Berger suggests we are

The 20 March bombings of two mosques in Sanaa, which killed more than 140 people, sparked a Saudi-led intervention in Yemen.  

Berger notes that the array of conflicts “involves a cyclone of explosive elements: religious extremism, proxy war, sectarian tension, tribal rivalries, terrorist rivalries, and U.S. counterterrorism policies.”

Comment: Nearly every country spanning the arc from Pakistan to Libya is involved in some sort of conflict. This kaleidoscope of violence involves much more than the Arab world.

Interestingly, the prospect of an important nuclear deal this summer that lifts sanctions on Iran may have prompted the Saudis to act quickly and aggressively in Yemen.

If we are seeing the advent of a super-regional maelstrom that may amplify ethnic, tribal, national, and sectarian tensions, the impact from South Asia to the Middle East and into North Africa (SA-ME-NA) will be profound.

What should the U.S. do? Here are some initial thoughts:

1. Develop a broad policy vision for the region that supports issues such as durable peace, freedom, human rights, and self-determination.  This will likely result in elections of some parties that the U.S. might not like.  Such prospect is probably lower risk in the long-term than being on the side of despots.

2. Aggregate allies rather than enemies.  Various private intelligence companies and defense contractors have economic incentives for threat proliferation.  The U.S. should have enough of an open mind look for and cultivate allies and partners that share broad objectives.  As President Ronald Reagan noted, anyone who agrees with us on 80% of the issues is probably an ally.  This approach is likely to prove more effective than considering anyone who disagrees with us on 20% of the issues to be an enemy.

3. Avoid being rented.  The U.S. would often come running with money and munitions whenever someone suggested al Qaeda were afoot.  That was understandable after September 11.  The consequences have been significant.  The U.S. should now avoid such a Pavlovian response. Otherwise, actors with a variety of agendas will dangle the latest extremist group as bait for U.S. military action against local and regional foes.

What should Non Profits do?

1. If your organization is already operating in the SAMENA region, you should begin assessing both tactical and strategic risks to your efforts.  Tactical risk includes proximity to active fighting zones and potential effects on your ability to continue operations.  Strategic risk takes into account the impact on your efforts in the region as a whole. Will you be able to continue operating? Do you need to diversify functionally or geographically?

A good set of risk assessments will help you prevent loss of life among local staff and partners; loss of funds through extortion, graft, and damaged or incomplete projects; and lost opportunities due to over-reactions.

2. Look for potential opportunities for impact.  The course of a wider regional conflict will be unpredictable and will have profound implications on civilians and children — people most vulnerable to violent groups.  Examine potential opportunities where your non profit could have the greatest impact.  Your strategy and operations will need to have sufficient flexibility to react to emerging needs.

3. Be patient, build relationships, and promote local ownership.   Organizations wanting to make a splash in a hurry are at highest risk to having their support hijacked for private gain.  High cost and low impact is an outcome to avoid.  Do your homework on the situation and need, build relationships, and patiently develop local ownership and transparency. Sometimes you have to start slow to have a rapid and persistent impact.

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Christopher D. Kolenda is President and CEO of Kolenda Strategic Leadership which helps NonProfits maximize their impact and leadership.  He commanded Paratroopers in combat and served as Senior Advisor to the Department of Defense Senior Leadership and to three Commanders of International Forces (ISAF) over four tours in Afghanistan.  See his two books on applied leadership and strategy: Leadership: The Warrior’s Art and The Counterinsurgency Challenge.  Follow me @KSLCEO

CNN’s Isa Soares interviews Chris Kolenda about Afghanistan

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Christopher Kolenda discusses Afghanistan on CNN

Christopher Kolenda discusses Afghanistan on CNN

In this interview with CNN, Christopher Kolenda discusses Islamic State presence in Afghanistan; the plight of Afghan people over 36 years of war; and how kleptocratic corruption undermines the Afghan government, economy and future.  See the interview here.

You may also use this link.

http://www.cnn.com/video/data/2.0/video/tv/2015/04/08/exp-the-business-view-isa-soares-chris-kolenda.cnn.html

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Christopher D. Kolenda is President and CEO of Kolenda Strategic Leadership which helps NonProfits maximize their impact and leadership.  He commanded Paratroopers in combat and served as Senior Advisor to the Department of Defense Senior Leadership and to three Commanders of International Forces (ISAF) over four tours in Afghanistan.  See his two books on applied leadership: Leadership: The Warrior’s Art and The Counterinsurgency Challenge.  Follow me @KSLCEO

Should the U.S. support air strikes in Libya?

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Those chaps over there are “Islamic State” — bomb them.

Should the U.S. support air strikes in Libya?

Egyptian President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi thinks so, calling on the U.N. Security Council to authorize military action in Libya.  This, after Egypt bombed alleged Islamic State targets there in response to the depraved beheading of 21 Egyptian Coptic Christians.  Egypt and its Libyan allies urged the U.S. and anti-IS coalition to expand their bombing campaign from Iraq and Syria to Libya.

Comment:  Think first, act smartly.  The U.S. and others should resist the potential rush to failure.  Air strikes in the absence of a proper strategy carry high risk of unintended consequences that could make matters worse.  The February – October 2011 military-centric NATO campaign (Unified Protector) ultimately helped remove Libyan dictator Moammar Qadhafi, but left a political vacuum in its wake.  Managing the aftermath and growing internal crisis was outsourced to the U.N.(UNSMIL) with predictable results — especially as key international actors have provided little to no substantive backing.

Complicating matters is the fact that Libya is a country without a state.  In fact, it has two coalitions at war with one another, both claiming to be the legitimate government.  The international community recognizes the Dignity government, which is based in the Eastern city of Tobruk, and is supported by Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and United Arab Emirates.  Turkey (a NATO ally) and Qatar (a key Gulf partner) support Libya Dawn, a collection of militias and Islamist groups in Tripoli that formed a ruling coalition after Qadhafi’s death.  The Libyan branch of Islamic State has grown in the chaos of civil war.

These internal and external rivalries, and our ignorance of local realities, heighten the likelihood that any U.S. or coalition military efforts will be exploited cynically to advance partisan agendas.  We have fallen victim in Afghanistan and Iraq to such tactics as rivals were labelled as “al Qaeda” in score-settling feuds.  Islamic State is the new bogeyman.

Nonetheless, the chaos in Libya and the growth of Islamic State affiliates there merit considered action.

If we are serious about stability in Libya, let’s develop and execute a proper strategy.  Such a strategy should integrate all relevant elements of national power — political, diplomatic, economic, military, etc. — into a coherent whole.  We may find that we do not need U.S. or NATO military force at all.  Our best strategy, in fact, might center on diplomatic and economic efforts to facilitate and then help enforce a durable political solution.

We should also begin coming to grips with the fact that our national security structures are not fit for purpose.  Built to manage the Cold War and, if necessary, to wage war against the Soviet Union, these structures are proving inadequate to manage the proliferation of small wars.  This problem needs serious attention.

 

Impact is a NonProfit’s bottom line.  My Mission is to help you thrive.   

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Christopher D. Kolenda is President and CEO of Kolenda Strategic Leadership which helps NonProfits maximize their impact and leadership.  He commanded Paratroopers in combat and served as Senior Advisor to the Department of Defense Senior Leadership and to three Commanders of International Forces (ISAF) over four tours in Afghanistan.  See his two books on applied leadership: Leadership: The Warrior’s Art and The Counterinsurgency Challenge.  Follow me @KSLCEO

 

Is sending arms to Ukraine a good idea?

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31f75df759_Logo-01[1]Is sending arms to Ukraine a good idea? Foreign Policy’s Steven Walt disagrees with several key U.S. thought-leaders– experts who have the attention of the Obama Administration – who think we should.  Walt argues that Russia’s actions are better explained by deep insecurities rather than insatiable expansionism.  Careful accommodation, he argues, would be more effective than deterrence.

 

Comment: Putin is likely acting to prevent further strategic loss, rather than seeking to protect strategic gains.  Russia’s increasing economic crisis, fear of NATO expansion, and declining power are persistent and growing problems.  Nobel prize winner Daniel Kahneman argues in Thinking, Fast and Slow, that people tend to take risks to avoid likely further losses, but will act conservatively to preserve gains.  If Putin sees himself as needing to reverse a losing strategic situation, he may be likely to continue risk-seeking behavior.

 

On a separate note, Ukraine reportedly cannot even supply its troops in the fight with food and ammunition.  Until Ukraine shows it can do so reliably, sending arms may do little practical good.  If Ukraine continues operating as a kleptocacy, sending arms and more money may even create significant perverse incentives.  See Sarah Chayes’ new book, Thieves of State.

 

 

Impact is a NonProfit’s bottom line.  My Mission is to help you thrive.  

 

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Christopher D. Kolenda is President and CEO of Kolenda Strategic Leadership which helps NonProfits maximize their impact and leadership.  He commanded Paratroopers in combat and served as Senior Advisor to the Department of Defense Senior Leadership and to three Commanders of International Forces (ISAF) over four tours in Afghanistan.  See his two books on applied leadership: Leadership: The Warrior’s Art and The Counterinsurgency Challenge.  Follow me @KSLCEO

 

Did Torture Cost American Lives?

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Some argue that torture “helped” save American lives.  It is appropriate, therefore, to askwhether it helped cost American lives – and civilian lives – too.  Aside from the deeply troubling moral and legal issues contained in the Senate report, the perception that America tortured detainees as a matter of official policy had real consequences in combat.

See my article here.

 

Christopher D. Kolenda is a Senior Military Fellow at King’s College London and President and CEO of Kolenda Strategic Leadership which helps Not-for-Profit organizations maximize their impact in conflict zones.  He commanded Paratroopers in combat and served as Senior Advisor to three Commanders of International Forces (ISAF) over four tours in Afghanistan.  See his two books on applied combat leadership: Leadership: The Warrior’s Art and The Counterinsurgency Challenge.

Kolenda Strategic Leadership LLC

Kolenda Strategic Leadership LLC